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LARRY BRUNEEL"

Bypass as an Option for Health:
Medicine v. Business'
Bypass can connote either a positive or negative action depending
on whether you are in an economics class, in a small town, in a doctor's
office, or in the business world. In a small town, you mention bypass and
you might get the reaction that everything was going well until they built
that bypass up the road a bit. Then the town dried up and one by one
everyone moved away leaving Andy Griffith to run what's left. Does this
have a corollary to electric utilities? Will today's utility CEO be tomorrow's
Don Knotts? We all like getting to our destination faster, but is there a price
for this newfound efficiency?
You could look at the term bypass in the context of open heart
surgery where the surgeon is trying to save the patient by bypassing the
blockage to healthy circulation. Years of eggs, sausage, and butter can lead
to open heart bypass surgery. This could be the view of the electric
customer looking for paths around the blocking utility. They want to bypass
the old and dying tissue and replace it with fresh and healthy tissue.
Today's electric customers are looking for the surgeon that can perform this
radical new procedure without killing the patient. Will it be Dan Schaefer,
M.D. or Dr. Markey Kildare? Ben "Casey" Johnson is retiring at the end of
the season. Some patients are not waiting for the doctor and are trying to
perform the operation on themselves.
Bypass takes on a different connotation when you enter the
business world. People tend to think of economic bypass as avoiding the
middleman. Bypass could be defined as trying to avoid a cost that one
would otherwise be obligated to pay. This seems to be the situation that
many utilities are facing as they watch customers trying to avoid paying
high electric bills.
In what context should we look at the term bypass? Does it have a
positive or negative connotations? Obviously, the answer is both. Where
you stand on the retail bypass question is likely, where you sit. Your view
on bypass depends on whether you are a utility executive facing an
increasingly agitated group of investors or whether you are a retail
customer facing high electric bills. From these respective positions, there is
a right answer and a wrong answer, which happen to be different. This is
exactly why we have regulators, legislators and well founded democratic

- Technical Advisor to Commissioner Vicky A. Bailey. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
1.

Adaptation of remarks given at the University of New Mexico School of Law,

Symposium on Electric Industry Bypass Policy.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 37

processes for resolving tough social questions. Decision makers need to be
able to step out of the fray and look at broader social interests.
What I think we are all concerned about are the details of customer
choice. Hopefully, we are past the point of discussing whether customers
will get choice or not, because the availability of customer choice is
inevitable. It may not be tomorrow or the next day, but it is. already
happening and will continue to happen. The big question is who is going to
pay for the investments made to serve customers before they were given a
choice of power suppliers. Try as we might, discussion of stranded costs
cannot be avoided when we address customer choice issues.
Commitments and investments made in the old electric industry
environment may not be the same ones that would be made in a more open
and competitive environment. The old way of conducting business was
characterized by captive customers and regulated returns. The new way of
doing business may not have captive anything and returns may fluctuate
with regard to risks taken. The problem is that some of those old
investments are still not paid off. Given that the government is involved in
changing the electric business environment, the question must be asked,
"should government provide some assurances of recovery of those past
investments?"
In last year's Economic Report of the President,President Clinton's
Council of Economic Advisors pointed out the differences of risk in
regulated versus unregulated markets. Specifically, the Council
demonstrated how protection from the risk of competition is traded for
limited returns on good investments. However, when the rules of
competition change, "a strong case therefore can be made for allowing
utilities to recover stranded costs where these costs arise from after-the-fact
mistakes or changes in regulatory philosophy toward competition, as long
as the investments were initially authorized by regulators."
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [HEREINAFTER
Commission) noted this advice from the President's economic council. The
Commission also noted that legislators from both sides of the aisle were
offering similar opinions. Chairman Schaefer, Senator Johnson and
Chairman Murkowski have all talked about the need to honor past
commitments as the electric industry goes through this transition. In the
end, the Commission took a principled stand on the issue of stranded cost
recovery. The Commission's position was not an easy one, and there has
certainly been much criticism of it's final decision. However, there has been
virtually no criticism of the Commission's process. After two Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking and almost two years of comments, discussion and
reflection, it is unlikely that anyone would complain that they did not have
a chance to express their views. The real question is how many times did
they express them?
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The Commission has issued a clear statement and proposal for
recovery of wholesale stranded costs. Specifically, the Commission's
position is that it will provide for recovery of legitimate, verifiable, and
prudent wholesale stranded costs. In the purely retail stranded cost issue,
the Commission has asserted a leadership role in advising the states to
attend to this issue. The Commission did this, not to pre-empt the states, but
to highlight the fact that because retail stranded costs are potentially so
large as to threaten the financial health of some companies, the recovery of
retail stranded costs is national in scope. Certainly, nobody wishes to
bankrupt specific companies and to the extent the Commission can provide
leadership on the stranded cost recovery issue, it may be able to prevent
unnecessary financial harm.
The Commission's rules adopt the "revenues lost" approach for
identifying stranded costs. Essentially, this approach requires calculating
the amount of revenue a utility would have received from a particular
customer had that customer not left before expected. The Commission
adopted the approach over more complicated approaches that would have
required analysis of specific investments made and costs incurred to serve
specific customers. This more complicated approach would engender even
more litigation than is already likely.
Mitigation plays an important role in the stranded cost recovery
process. The Commission is not proposing to write a blank check for
utilities. Before the utility can recover any stranded cost, it must show that
it had a "reasonable expectation" of continuing to serve the customer
beyond the terms of the contract. The Commission fully expects the power
that is abandoned by the customer gaining access to have some value in the
marketplace. Therefore, this value will have to be subtracted from the
amount the customer would have paid to the utility in determining the
amount the utility can recover.
Any amount of stranded cost recovery will probably, at least
initially, have an impact on market transactions in a way that limits
opportunities for low price suppliers. Accordingly, we must balance market
opportunities against the need for fairness in treating past commitments.
When the Commission sought to induce open access on gas pipelines
without addressing stranded cost issues, the Court remanded the issue to
us to present an approach for recovery. And the recent DC decision appears
to affirm the basic decision to allow for stranded cost recovery.
While there may be some short-term impacts of allowing for
stranded cost recovery, there may also be ways to minimize the interference
in the marketplace. There have been proposals for spreading out costs over
time so as to impose the same amount of stranded cost on consumers, but
on a smaller per unit basis. More efficient use of stranded assets also
minimizes stranded costs. Even with the best mitigation measures,
customers will still look for supply option that avoids any method of
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stranded cost imposition. Self-generation options and even moving to new
service territories may allow customers to escape stranded cost
responsibilities. Customers will probably look for loopholes to bypass high
bills. Such drastic responses to stranded cost recovery are not desirable and
the Commission must not inadvertently encourage such responses. Instead,
the Commission should strive to design a fair and reasonable nonbypassable recovery mechanism, in the best interests of the public.
The Commission's goal is not to harm companies financially by
encouraging competition. The Commission wants financially sound
companies to continue to operate and serve customers. It is not in the public
interest to force resolution of these issues in bankruptcy courts.
Clearly, there is one major force in today's environment that has
spurred interest in bypass. That force is that the marginal price of power is
coming down and prospects for access to that economical power are more
tangible now than they have ever been. Open access in wholesale markets
is a reality and will force prices even lower. In addition, retail competition,
which is coming to some jurisdictions, will give customers direct access to
lower priced power. Both of these scenarios, however, will take time to
produce benefits. Due to the good policy reasons for allowing recovery of
transition costs as we move from a fully regulated to a less regulated
industry, many are looking for shortcuts to get the benefits of lower prices
now rather than later.
The guiding philosophy behind the Commission's stranded cost
policy is to fill all gaps in the recovery of stranded costs. For pure wholesale
costs, the Commission has developed an approach to recovery. For pure
retail costs, states will take the lead. For retail turned wholesale costs, the
Commission is the primary forum with the recognition of the state role.
Decision makers are trying to make the transition as fair as possible by
developing new rules relevant to today's and hopefully tomorrow's
marketplace.
People will probably try to find shortcuts around the transition
process. However, for reasons of equity and fairness, this transition and the
availability of its benefits to all customers should be made in an orderly
manner. The Commission should prevent gaps in the approach to ensure
that the transition is fair to all consumers. As long as customers look for
loopholes in stranded cost recovery, this issue will stay alive.
While states study the possibilities of retail competition, some
customers are seeking alternative ways to gain access to lower cost power
supplies. Retail competition requires transmission access which means
Commission involvement. Transmission access can come from the Commission if it does not violate the Federal Power Act, particularly sections 212(g)
and (h), it can come from a state order (which requires Commission action
on rates, terms and conditions), or it can come from new statutory authority. Sections 212(g) and (h) place limits on the Commission's authority.
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Sections 212(g) and (h) prohibit the Commission from issuing any
order under the Federal Power Act that is inconsistent with state retail
marketing area decisions. The sections also prohibit Commission decisions
which will result in the provision of transmission service to ultimate
consumers through sham transactions. These sections were intended to
prevent the Commission from ordering retail wheeling and to preserve any
authority that States may have in that regard.
Sections 212(g) and (h) fit well into the Commission's no loophole
approach. For example, if a state orders retail access for entities it deems
eligible, the State should consider without interference from the
Commission, stranded costs caused by such access. Likewise, if an entity is
eligible for Commission ordered transmission service, then the Commission
should consider costs stranded as a result of the access provided. An entity
should not, however, be able to slip through the cracks and get access
without some regulatory body giving due consideration to the need for
stranded cost recovery caused by the newly provided access.
I believe the Commission in putting in place a no loopholes policy.
Several state actions accord well with the approach. The MIT decision in
Massachusetts, the California restructuring proceeding, the recent
Pennsylvania transition proposal, and others show a commitment to fair
recovery of costs which become stranded when customers are given choices.
The Commission's Palm Springs decisions regarding natural gas bypass are
consistent with this policy approach as well. After all, if the Commission is
going to take the heat for making the decision to allow for stranded cost
recovery, then it should also implement the policy.
In sum, bypass should not be a free lunch. Customers may find
legitimate and illegitimate ways to bypass existing arrangements on supply.
However, the Commission should strive to make sure it is not a means for
avoiding cost responsibilities. Customers may find self-service ways to get
choice, but the Commission should diligently apply whatever stranded cost
decisions it ultimately makes.

